A. HISTORY: From Power to Neglect.
B. CURRENT STATUS. [major revision: January, 2008]
C. ANALYSIS. [minor revision: January 2008]
D. STRATEGIES TO END THE CONFLICT. [minor revision: January 2008]
This article is based on the
assumption that the clearer our perception of reality, the better our chance of
success, where success here means an end to the atrocities in
The violence
in
The information was basically
correct; but if that is all that one heard, fairly simple solutions might be
envisioned. However most careful
analysts feel that the underlying causes of the violence are varied and complicated,
including: battles over land and other resources; long-ago political decisions;
ethnic divisions; Islamist power struggles; stratagems in the just-ended civil
war and regional instability. Martin
Bell, UNICEF
A.
HISTORY: From Power to Neglect
Long before the colonial period
had drawn the various lines across Africa, the
A few things should be noted
regarding this era. First,
Separately, during the early 19th
century, the Turco-Egyption invasion established the
main part of
As noted by the map with
THE ENVIRONMENTAL & LAND FACTOR. [Updated August, 2007]
As noted above, there was a
certain seasonal dynamic in
I agree with a May
7, 2007
article in Time
magazine, that
climate change is more of a factor than originally thought and is
definitely a “threat
multiplier” in such zones, although I think the argument was
over-extended and slightly deceptive in
its suggestion that the roots of the conflict “may have more
to do with ecology
then ethnicity.” It is a multi-faceted,
multi-layered cocktail - take away the desertification and
water shortage and you still have more than enough factors to create
genocidal tendencies.
As a recent case in point, on July 18, 2007, it was announced that a huge underground lake had been discovered in northern Darfur (see BBC article; it was later countered by the notion that it could be dried up, although it still suggested there is enough water around that can be drilled, BBC 2nd article) This would be wonderful news for the Darfuri people if a just-peace deal can be achieved. But environmental issues are not a crimes-against-humanity initiator (people and policies are); thus water can wonderfully reduce normal tensions and elevate the grinding level of living so close to drought and starvation (although even that will partly depend on who controls it), but reducing environmental pressures will not eliminate genocidal or ethnic-cleansing motivated dynamics. One should note in the first article that it "has long been known there was water in the area but the government had not paid for it to be exploited."
WHO ARE THE JANJAWEED?
The basic meaning of Janjaweed is
“devils on horseback.” But historically
it has taken on two distinct meanings.
Originally as part of that seasonal dynamic in
Quite distinct from that usage,
though based on its basic meaning, there arose the politicized version. Sometimes referred to as “counterinsurgency
on the cheap” (de Waal), these would be deliberate efforts by the government
(always denied) to recruit and arm such Arab groups, reinforced by fighters
from other nations such as Libya & Chad, as well as deliberately freed
prisoners (even the best known Janjaweed leader, Musa Hilal,
was freed from prison so he could help orchestrate the Janjaweed) to implement
counter insurgency tactics, which generally involved terrorizing the civilian
base from which the rebel group arose.
Numbers range around 12,000 – 30,000.
Although the government has denied
involvement, clear evidence points otherwise, whether consistent victim reports
of government planes hitting villages just before the Janjaweed attacked,
eyewitness accounts of Janjaweed and military figures mingling during or after
raids, or even Janjaweed wearing uniforms.
But one must also recognize that
due to the rogue element from which they derive, and given the lawless nature
of
THE ARAB-AFRICAN QUESTION.
But it is much more
complicated. First,
To appreciate how this
politicization came about, one needs to know that in the 1970’s the Libyan
leader Muammar Gaddafi had a vision of a pan-Arab state straddling the
desert. He planted seeds of Arab supremacism (and later arms) in Darfur and felt
THE REBELS.
There were two original rebel
groups. The first was the Justice and
Equity Movement (JEM) – they are highly organized and
effective communicators, although they had few boots on the ground. They arose from dissatisfaction with the
unfair and perhaps un-Islamist ways that the GoS
treated the periphery. Their central
figure is Dr. Ibrahim (lived outside Sudan until recently), with roots going back to 1993, when a
group formed and started to strategize about how best to govern
The other main original rebel group is the
Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA). Unlike JEM, they had little central ideological glue and were
poorly organized – their main cohesion was their complete dissatisfaction with
the GoS treatment, and felt that after all the failed
attempts over the years to rectify the problem, the only solution was armed
conflict. Militarily they are the far
stronger group, having largely planned the two initial attacks in early 2003,
which awoke the GoS and produced its
counter-insurgency tactics. Finally they
are for a secular government.
Three years later the SLA split –
one of whom signed the Darfur Peace Agreement of May 2006 (Mini Minawi, though many of his forces have backed out) – and
later regrouped under the National Redemption Front, but which may still
contain up to a dozen factions of uncertain loyalty. JEM also recently spilt into two. See Current Status, below, for more recent rebel developments.
There have been many reports of
rebel armed violations on civilians, which will also need to be addressed.
First, it is easy to get the two
wars confused. But the North-South war
preceded the open Darfur conflict by almost a couple of decades, resulted in 2
million dead and 4 million people displaced and was really the continuation of
an earlier war (1955-1972). Most
relevant here is that during the preceding couple of years of negotiations that
led to its settlement in 2005 (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, CPA), the
THE GENOCIDE QUESTION
Several groups have called the
killings in Darfur, genocide, including former
Genocide is formally defined in
the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm)
and is not without debate. Regarding
There is not space here to enter
the general debate other than to say that ethnic cleansing and genocide share
much overlap (not the least of which both are horrific and are crimes against
humanity), and genocide, commonly used, carries greater weight and is more
likely to be used in such situations where some see ambiguity and when world
attention is sought. There is no doubt
that whatever one calls the dynamics, the GoS has
used it before, for example in the
http://howgenocidesend.ssrc.org/de_Waal2/
Finally AfricaAction has a download PDF in which they assert that genocide is the correct term for the atrocities in Darfur (Link: Darfur As Genocide PDF).
9/11 AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM FACTOR.
While there was a period of time
when Osama bin Laden resided in
OIL AND THE CHINA FACTOR.
China buys most of Sudan's oil (and also supplies arms to Sudan, along with Russia), which comes from S. Sudan. It accounts for about 5 percent of China's oil imports. As a UN Security Council member they have blocked numerous resolutions against Sudan. However there are signs of a shift in China's position, as activists move to link this protectionist stance toward Sudan with China's upcoming 2008 Olympics - preparing to label them the 'Genocide Olympics.' if China does not exert pressure on the GoS to stop their atrocities against civilians and negotiate with the rebels.
U.S., CHINA AND THE OIL IN DARFUR QUESTION. [Added: August, 2007]
Is there oil in Darfur? A map of oil concessions shows that Block 6, controlled by China, extends into S. Darfur. An article in the L.A. Times indicated that while the hunt is on, no oil has been found yet, while an article in FinancialSense indicates that Sudan says they have found oil in Darfur. Given that oil was found on the S. Kordofan province border, it seems likely that it extends into Darfur. Oil in N. Darfur seem less certain (although my Darfuri contacts say there is). It is too speculative right now to do more than raise the issue and acknowledge that ink is spent on denying oil; on theories, conspiratorial or not, about the collusion of the US, the CIA and oil companies; and on China's race to secure as much oil (and other resources) as possible on the African continent (they are actively trying to lure Chad's oil). To what extent there are hidden hands behind the scenes is beyond the scope of this article, except to say that any US collusion (and thus desire for regime change) would have to be squared with the general US trump card mentioned above - terrorist intelligence. And regardless, it remains an open question whether the search for oil in Darfur intensifies the conflict (that is, Sudan wants to grab it from Darfur; though the DPA indicates oil-sharing would ensue) or whether it might ease the tensions, since any oil company, whether Chinese, US or Canadian, can work in conflict regions, but much prefers secure terrain. See Current Status regarding rebels attacks on oil fields.
B. CURRENT STATUS
(Major revision: January 2008)
Deaths: There is much less fighting compared to its height in 2004 & 2005, in no small part because up to 90% of the villages have been destroyed – there simply are not as many easy targets. The number of overall deaths is conservatively estimated to be at least 200,000 with many suggesting it is closer to 400,000 or above [In August, 2007 there was criticism of the 400,000 figure - see NYT article. Eric Reeves, who has provided the most extensive analysis, counters with a scathing critique of the methods used. I agree with a ForeignPolicy critique, that 200,000 is likely far too low, Sudan clearly obstructs any true attempt at accurate figures, and, regardless, either number is appalling].
By 2005 the proportion of deaths reversed, with more people dying indirectly due to disease, etc in the refugee and IDP camps. Later, due to the humanitarian agencies, the camp death and disease rate lessened somewhat (though were still mottled with infiltration, rapes etc), but the agencies became increasingly at risk (hijackings and even deaths of workers), and were sometimes forced to pull-out. By the end of 2007, reports indicated a major deterioration, as the camps were full, the GoS has tried to forcibly remove some people back to the land, and arms have flooded the camps.
As well, throughout this period the conflict spilled
over the border into
Peace Agreements: Apart from the {non-Darfur} Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed January 9, 2005 to end the North-South war, the basic Darfur peace agreement dynamics have been as follows:
A. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA, May, 2006): It was breached soon after it went into effect. The one rebel party who signed it, has been accused of aiding the counter-insurgency, and has reportedly had many of its fighters leave. Its head, Mini Minawi, was appointed Special Assistant to Sudan's president.
B. The UN Security Council Resolution 1706, passed on August 31, 2006, authorized a UN peacekeeping force of 20,000 under the robust engagement of a Chapter VII mandate, to replace the inadequate African Union force of 7,000 operating under a "observer-only" mandate. While this was a remarkable vote in that China and Russia abstained rather than their customary vetoing any substantive act against Sudan, it still became quagmired due to Sudan's refusal to accept it (the resolution did not need Sudan's consent; it only "invited" it) which divided the international whether to proceed regardless.
It should be noted that while the initial GoS reaction was to cite fears of neocolonialism, which has played well for it own audience, it is an absurd claim, given that they have allowed over 10,000 UN peacekeeping troops in S. Sudan to help with the CPA (the North-South agreement).
C. The Three-Phase Plan: Subsequently there was much diplomatic pressure on the GoS to agree to a three-phase plan to allow more peacekeeping troops in under the guise of an AU-UN hybrid, 3-stage transition force. Sudan initially balked, but later agreed to all three phases, and even allowed implementation of the first two {easier} phases.
D. Efforts to Unite Rebels: Starting in July, 2007, in a meeting in Libya, five of the {minor} rebel groups agreed to unite, in anticipation of renewed {start of the start of} peace negotiations, which took place in Tanzania in August and included most of the rebel factions. There are continuing efforts to bring Abdel Wahed Mohamed el-Nur (an originator of the SLA) to the negotiations, since while he has little troop presence, he is hugely popular, in what some see as a more realistic stance towards the GoS' often deferring and deflecting dynamics. See below for recent timeline. In December France allowed El-Nur to stay on condition that he attend upcoming peace negotiations. The JEM movement under Dr. Ibrahim, also boycotted most such efforts, although most seasoned analysts feel that artificial deadlines are harmful and the best prospect is exactly what is occurring - ongoing informal talks, such as have occurred in Juba.
On the ground, the rebels remain splintered - JEM has split into two; there are over a dozen groups, though one must recognize that some are created with few resources merely for personal stature and gain. The SLA and JEM factions remain active militarily. JEM has recently attacked an oil field, shot down a GoS Antonov plane, and has attacked government poisitions, although it has been suggested that some of these efforts are in conjunction with one of the militraily strong SLA factions. Of more interest is that some of the Arab groups are joining the rebels, feeling they have largely been betrayed or manipulated by the GoS. As well, one of the strongest groups, the SLA/G19, are actively trying to unite various groups.
E. The UN Security Council Resolution 1769 (acronym UNAMID) was unanimously passed on July 31, 2007. It consolidated the efforts of 1706 and the UN-AU hybrid concept into a peacekeeping force of 26,000 (to be deployed likely by the spring of 2008). On the positive side, China and Russia agreed to the motion, Sudan has accepted it thus far, it contains the necessary robust Chapter VII mandate, and has clear milestones, noted below. On the negative side, its watered down nature glaringly excludes disarming the Janjaweed (present in previous motions), omitted a no-fly-zone protection (though this is a contentious issue with aid agencies who feel such restrictions would severely hamper their efforts), does not address border issues with Chad, and of most potential significance, has a timeline that invites classic GoS subverting and delaying tactics. Already there has been contention around its make-up (all-African or not) and perplexity about how the troop commitments will be filled. It should also be noted that during this period, Sudan again began some aerial bombing in Darfur and more OMINOUSLY, has allowed thousands of Janjaweed to occupy land left by the Darfurians who fled their homes.
You can now observe the timeline and its status/slippage:
October 2007: possible start of Sudan-Darfur rebels peace talks;
The talks took place in Libya but were unsuccessful, or more accurately premature, since the rebel factions have not agreed to a unified position. The rebels had earlier met but all the major groups boycotted the Libya talks. I think the best view of this is that it needs to be seen as one of many steps needed. It appears that the parties have learned from the failure of the DPA, where artificial deadlines were set and thus failure ensued. As long as genuine progress is being made - and there is much room and desire (as well as opportunity to delay and subvert things) - the dynamics should be allowed to reach their natural conclusion. The biggest current step is for the major rebels groups, combined with Darfur civil society more generally, to agree on their demands.
Oct 31: UNAMID command centre to be operational in Darfur;
Despite Sudan's foot-dragging, on Oct 31, the UN's first centre was reportedly operational in one provincial capital, El Fasher. This is very encouraging, though it is premature to say how significant it will be.
Dec 31: Transfer of authority from AU to UNAMID; Start of troop deployment.
On January 1, 2008, the existing AU troops replaced their green berets for the UN blue berets. Not much else has changed yet. Here is a sample of Bashir's obstructionist tactics that has slowed the efforts, to the point where questions are being raised about its viability: he has prohibited almost all non-African troops, often using absurd claims; he has dragged out the whole process through making visas and Port access difficult; and through pathetic negotiations on land and water usage for troops (yes, as with any good manipulator, there will be a grain of legitimacy somewhere in the issue), restrictions on airstrip usage, prohibiting night flights, requiring advance notice of troop movement and even requiring communications be shut down when Sudan conducts its own military operations.
Much more stunning has been the reticence of the Western world (and Arab world as well) to provide the heavy lift capabilities needed and requested months ago. The most striking example has been the UN request for 24 helicoters - the Secretary General specifically asked every UN member . . and has yet to get even a single helicopter committed!! It reinforces last year's synopsis that, apart from the world really not caring much or not having the institutional structures that can leverage the concern that exists, that Iraq has siphoned both resources and political will for Darfur. When that is layered atop some legitmate concerns about the logistics and ability to succeed, we end up with the tepid response that President Bashir relishes.
Refugee and IDP Camps: In the fall of 2006, many of the humanitarian NGOs issued a warning that they could not hold out much longer under current conditions that included restricted access and threats to its workers. Many areas outside the camps are inaccessible and thus there is no accurate way of knowing how many people are affected, though between 2.5 and 4 million people (out of 6 million in Darfur) forms the usual bounds for numbers.
In June, 2007, Oxfam permanently withdrew from Darfur's largest refugee camp of 130,00 people, Gereida, citing inaction over requests for better security, following the death of an aid worker, violence against others, and continual hijacking of vehicles of various agencies.
It must be noted that rape as a
weapon is still being used – women who venture outside the camps to get
firewood are often attacked and raped by the Janjaweed. Rape within some of the camps also occurs. In addition, by the end of 2007, it was reported that arms had been flooding into many camps, making them dangerous at any time.
International Criminal Court (ICC): On Feb. 27, 2007, the ICC
named its first two suspects for allegedly committing war crimes in
C. ANALYSIS [Updated: January, 2008]
The basic anchoring point is that one of the prime duties of a
government is to protect its people. Not
only has
The above brief survey should be sufficient to demonstrate that while there are many layers at play in this conflict, claims by the government tend to use selective and minor aspects of the overall picture (such as it being a conflict of farmers versus nomads, or that they can’t control the Janjaweed – yes there likely are both rogue and fickle elements as indicated above, but the overall picture leans heavily on the side of the GoS control). The GoS is a master of manipulation, deception and divide-and-conquer techniques.
Finally, while many reports tend to view the GoS as a unified entity, I find Alex de Waal's framing a balancing perspective, viewing it as a continuously in-flux and virtually dysfunctional struggle internally by various power groups and sub-groups, combining with pragmatic alliances with equally self-serving neighbouring players. The stronger one feels that this analysis is correct, the stronger one will advocate all other means of changing the calculus of the GoS, primarily via negotiation (largely based on or patterned after the CPA, improbable as he finds that), over any form of military intervention. And if military proposals are to be part of any package, they must not imply regime change (except through democratic elections, such as those scheduled by July 2009 as mandated by the CPA), since this regime, like almost any, would fight it and it has ably demonstrated its monstrous capabilities. His 26-page analysis (the 2nd of two PDF parts) can be Downloaded Here.
Thus, while I find de Waal's highly detailed and nuanced work of value, and have expanded the Strategy section below based on some of his observations, I also believe there is sufficient wriggle room to advocate a ramp-up on the various fronts. As he and others have noted, Sudan thrives on empty gestures; thus on all fronts (negotiations and other diplomatic channels; sanction threats and other forms of pressure; and peace-keeping operations) the ramp-up must be credible. And even with that, the key will be in the proper emphasis and timing within the complete package.
Summary of Major Stances: Before delving into the actual strategies, it should be noted that in many ways the Darfur crisis is a microcosm of international politics - no one can read the mind of another (in this case the GoS decision makers) nor predict with certainty the future; thus one is left making various risk-benefit assessments. In this case the broadest distinction is between those, such as Alex de Waal, who conceptually do not find genocidal intent rampant, but rather the above chaotic, shifting mix of agendas, and end up concluding that any military (or most other coercive) action will almost inevitably make things worse and that the focus must be on whatever instruments will strengthen democratic dynamics (thus ensure the CPA is supported and whatever else that will lead to the 2009 elections; as well as any negotiations that might mitigate Darfuri suffering now); and on the other hand, people like John Prendergast, who believe genocidal-or-ethnic-cleansing dynamics are deliberate and that coercive pressure (UN military, sanctions, divestments, etc) has a good chance of lessening those dynamics (as part of his 3Ps: peace negotiations, protection of civilians and punishment of those responsible). These distinct views require more dialogue to clarify best strategies (and I hope will occur). In general the strategies below are a mixture that leans more heavily on the latter stance, for reasons that currently remain beyond the scope of this article.
D. STRATEGIES TO END
THE CONFLICT [Revisions: Major: August, 2007; Minor: January, 2008]
There are three levels that require attention in order to bring lasting peace to Darfur: (1) Darfur and its relationship with the Sudanese government; (2) Sudan itself, which, due to its history of a strong center neglecting or playing off its peripheries, remains vulnerable to having any internal agreement unravel due to this unstable arrangement (for example, there is real concern about the possible unraveling of the CPA [North-South agreement], which would most likely drag down with it any Darfur agreement; brewing issues also exist in the East and in the North); (3) Sudan's neighbouring countries, which continually present instability factors.
1.
DARFUR: Just Peace Agreement:
Ultimately negotiation is the only step to a lasting peace. Steps to assist this include:
a.
Unifying the Rebel
Voice:
The rebel movement has fractured into many factions. Until the rebels can agree on a common set of
demands, negotiations will remain uncertain.
Efforts have occurred, although prior to the first two meetings their
locations were bombed by the GoS. More concerted international effort is needed
to expedite this process, and the August 2007 meetings were wobbly steps in this effort.
b.
Giving Darfur Its
Own Voice:
The original DPA was flawed in that it didn’t include
the voices of all the stakeholders in
c.
Changing the
Calculus of the GoS: so that it finds it in its own self-interest to enter into
true negotiations, as opposed to using negotiations as stalling tactics. (see
some of the interim actions).
2.
DARFUR: Interim Actions:
a.
The Janjaweed and all
other hostilities must be stopped. This
has been agreed to, and then ignored on several occasions.
b.
Ensure access for
humanitarian aid – it has often been restricted and aid workers threatened.
c.
Strengthen the
moderate voices within
d.
Freeze assets on key figures who planned or orchestrated
the atrocities;
e.
Authorize a forensic
accounting firm to aid those seeking to uncover the corruption of the GoS leaders and to try to trace companies providing
financial support to the illegal militias ( see ICG
Briefing #43, Oct 12, 2006);
f.
Impose travel bans on
key figures;
g.
Impose sanctions that
harm the perpetrators but not the population at large;
h.
Enforce no-fly zone
for Darfur, though only in conjunction with full package;
i.
Act to reduce the
growing effect in neighbouring countries;
3.
DARFUR: Last Resort:
a.
Implement the full
force of UN Security Council Resolution 1769, which transitions the woefully
understaffed 7000 AU peacekeepers into a more fully robust AU-UN hybrid mission
of an additional 26,000 personnel. UNSC 1769 took effect on Jan. 1, 2008, but has been hobbled both by GoS roadblocks and the international community's reluctance to fully embrace it (incredulously being unable thus far to find 24 - yes 24 - helicopters among the thousands that are collectively owned or could be leased . . . and yes it does require extra helicopters, acceptable pilots, maintenance personnel, etc - but still!!)
b.
It should be noted that according to some
analysts, such as former General Romeo Dallaire (who
headed the UN mission during the Rwandan genocide) that he estimates needing at
least 40,000 troops.
4.
SUDAN: Strengthen and Broaden the CPA:
The GoS has other smoldering peripheries than Darfur. The South's agreement, the CPA, which it signed in 2005, is fraying. Its deadlines are behind schedule, its division of oil revenues does not yet match its targets, etc. In many ways, the fate of Darfur and the South are intertwined. The GoS also has conflictual situations in the East and North. Unless it wants a perpetual state of crisis (which has served it well in the past, but does make it vulnerable to manipulation from neighbouring countries, as well as vulnerable to any form of uniting of the peripheries), it needs to strengthen the CPA and use it as a basis to address the country-wide concerns. While this seems like quite a conceptual leap, it must be continually raised up by the international community as Sudan's only real hope for stability. For more details, see International Crisis Group Recommendations.
5.
SUDAN'S NEIGHBOURS: Stabilize the Whole Region:
On August 22, 2007, a draft proposal was being circulated to help address the spillage of the Darfur conflict into Chad and the Central African Republic (See Guardian article; Update: The EU will send over 3,500 troops starting in Feb/08 - see Reuters article). While it holds some promise, it is only part of the overall picture that must be held in view. Sudan shares borders with 9 other countries; For example,on its eastern section, Sudan and Ethiopia have interacted for better and generally worse, for decades, and more recently Eritrea (and Dec/07, even Kenya convulsed, previously a relative bastion of stability, and aside, its opposition leader previously had ties to Sudan). Thus, at an even more conceptual leap than the above section, true peace and prosperity will require all neghbouring countries to achieve more stable dynamics, whether it is through the existing umbrella organization, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, or some other AU forum. As unthinkable as that may seem, it was at one point, as unthinkable among Europe's countries.
FINAL WORD
All above efforts should be done
simply for the sake of the Darfurian victims, and more generally victims within the entire region. However I wish to end on a more visionary
note, however improbable. Should the
Darfur crisis be properly resolved, one hundred years from now it just might
been seen as the pivotal tangible action that started the world towards the end
of genocide and other acts whereby international thugs had been allowed free
reign, hiding behind the rule of national sovereignty. The international pieces are in place to take
international structures and dynamics to a new plateau, thanks to the UN
Assembly’s accepting the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, and the UNSC adopting Resolution 1706, based on it (now morphed into Resolution 1769). I doubt I will see the fruition of this
process in my lifetime, but the ending of slavery did occur (with exceptions)
and while this next level is a quantum level more complex to implement, sooner
or later enough of the world will see that a more decent world dynamic is in
everyone’s best long-term interest and such a vision will prevail.
Main Sources:
M. W. Daly: Darfur's Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide (New York: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 2007): Most detailed and coherent of recent histories.
Alex de Waal, editor: War In Darfur And The Search For Peace (Harvard: Global Equity Initaitive, 2007): Interesting set of authors; worth it simply for Alex de Waal's highly detailed post-mortem of the DPA negotiation dynamics.
Julie Flint and Alex de Waal: Darfur: A Short History of a Long War (
Gerard Prunier:
Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide (
Various UN reports and documents; ICG, HRW, and SSRC (de Waal) reports; New York Times, Washington Post, and Sudan Tribune articles.
APPENDIX: SPREAD OF
BBC website: (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6213202.stm)
The BBC News website examines how this instability has spilled
over into neighbouring
JANJAWEED AND
1.
2.
CAR REBELS
3. The
4.