A. HISTORY: From Power to Neglect.
- Basic Factors Involved.
B. CURRENT STATUS. [major revision: January, 2010]
- Summary within Darfur, Sudan, and Internationally.
- ICC Prosecutor's Call to Indict President Bashir and Resulting Charges.
- Attempted Coup of May 10, 2008.
C. ANALYSIS. [minor revision: August 2009]
D. STRATEGIES TO END THE CONFLICT. [minor revision: March 2009]
Preamble:
This article is based on the
assumption that the clearer our perception of reality, the better our chance of
success, where success here means an end to the atrocities in
The violence
in
The information was basically
correct; but if that is all that one heard, fairly simple solutions might be
envisioned. However most careful
analysts feel that the underlying causes of the violence are varied and complicated,
including: battles over land and other resources; long-ago political decisions;
ethnic divisions; Islamist power struggles; stratagems in the just-ended civil
war and regional instability. Martin
Bell, UNICEF
A.
HISTORY: From Power to Neglect
Long before the colonial period
had drawn the various lines across Africa, the
A few things should be noted
regarding this era. First,
Separately, during the early 19th
century, the Turco-Egyption invasion established the
main part of
As noted by the map with
THE ENVIRONMENTAL & LAND FACTOR. [Updated August, 2007]
As noted above, there was a
certain seasonal dynamic in
I agree with a May
7, 2007
article in Time
magazine, that
climate change is more of a factor than originally thought and is
definitely a “threat
multiplier” in such zones, although I think the argument was
over-extended and slightly deceptive in
its suggestion that the roots of the conflict “may have more
to do with ecology
then ethnicity.” It is a multi-faceted,
multi-layered cocktail - take away the desertification and
water shortage and you still have more than enough factors to create
genocidal tendencies.
As a recent case in point, on July 18, 2007, it was announced that a huge underground lake had been discovered in northern Darfur (see BBC article; it was later countered by the notion that it could be dried up, although it still suggested there is enough water around that can be drilled, BBC 2nd article) This would be wonderful news for the Darfuri people if a just-peace deal can be achieved. But environmental issues are not a crimes-against-humanity initiator (people and policies are); thus water can wonderfully reduce normal tensions and elevate the grinding level of living so close to drought and starvation (although even that will partly depend on who controls it), but reducing environmental pressures will not eliminate genocidal or ethnic-cleansing motivated dynamics. One should note in the first article that it "has long been known there was water in the area but the government had not paid for it to be exploited."
WHO ARE THE JANJAWEED?
The basic meaning of Janjaweed is
“devils on horseback.” But historically
it has taken on two distinct meanings.
Originally as part of that seasonal dynamic in
Quite distinct from that usage,
though based on its basic meaning, there arose the politicized version. Sometimes referred to as “counterinsurgency
on the cheap” (de Waal), these would be deliberate efforts by the government
(always denied) to recruit and arm such Arab groups, reinforced by fighters
from other nations such as Libya & Chad, as well as deliberately freed
prisoners (even the best known Janjaweed leader, Musa Hilal,
was freed from prison so he could help orchestrate the Janjaweed) to implement
counter insurgency tactics, which generally involved terrorizing the civilian
base from which the rebel group arose.
Numbers range around 12,000 – 30,000.
Although the government has denied
involvement, clear evidence points otherwise, whether consistent victim reports
of government planes hitting villages just before the Janjaweed attacked,
eyewitness accounts of Janjaweed and military figures mingling during or after
raids, or even Janjaweed wearing uniforms.
But one must also recognize that
due to the rogue element from which they derive, and given the lawless nature
of
THE ARAB-AFRICAN QUESTION.
But it is much more
complicated. First,
To appreciate how this
politicization came about, one needs to know that in the 1970’s the Libyan
leader Muammar Gaddafi had a vision of a pan-Arab state straddling the
desert. He planted seeds of Arab supremacism (and later arms) in Darfur and felt
THE REBELS.
There were two original rebel
groups. The first was the Justice and
Equity Movement (JEM) – they are highly organized and
effective communicators, although they had few boots on the ground. They arose from dissatisfaction with the
unfair and perhaps un-Islamist ways that the GoS
treated the periphery. Their central
figure is Dr. Ibrahim (lived outside Sudan until recently), with roots going back to 1993, when a
group formed and started to strategize about how best to govern
The other main original rebel group is the
Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA). Unlike JEM, they had little central ideological glue and were
poorly organized – their main cohesion was their complete dissatisfaction with
the GoS treatment, and felt that after all the failed
attempts over the years to rectify the problem, the only solution was armed
conflict. Militarily they were the far
stronger group, having largely planned the two initial attacks in early 2003,
which awoke the GoS and produced its
counter-insurgency tactics. Finally they
are for a secular government.
Three years later the SLA split –
one of whom signed the Darfur Peace Agreement of May 2006 (Mini Minawi, though many of his forces have backed out) – and
later regrouped under the National Redemption Front, but which may still
contain up to a dozen factions of uncertain loyalty, as well as the more recent and more significant umbrella group, SLA/Unity, which includes the highly respected humanitarian coordinator, Suleiman Jamous. JEM also recently spilt into two. See Current Status, below, for more recent rebel developments.
There have been many reports of
rebel armed violations on civilians, which will also need to be addressed.
First, it is easy to get the two
wars confused. But the North-South war
preceded the open Darfur conflict by almost a couple of decades, resulted in 2
million dead and 4 million people displaced and was really the continuation of
an earlier war (1955-1972). Most
relevant here is that during the preceding couple of years of negotiations that
led to its settlement in 2005 (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, CPA), the
THE GENOCIDE QUESTION
Several groups have called the
killings in Darfur, genocide, including former
Genocide is formally defined in
the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm)
and is not without debate. Regarding
There is not space here to enter
the general debate other than to say that ethnic cleansing and genocide share
much overlap (not the least of which both are horrific and are crimes against
humanity), and genocide, commonly used, carries greater weight and is more
likely to be used in such situations where some see ambiguity and when world
attention is sought. There is no doubt
that whatever one calls the dynamics, the GoS has
used it before, for example in the
http://howgenocidesend.ssrc.org/de_Waal2/
In addition, AfricaAction has a download PDF in which they assert that genocide is the correct term for the atrocities in Darfur (Link: Darfur As Genocide PDF).
Finally, see Current Status, below, for the ongoing case before the International Criminal Court (ICC) whereby its chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, has brought charges of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes against Sudan's President Bashir.
9/11 AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM FACTOR.
While there was a period of time
when Osama bin Laden resided in
OIL AND THE CHINA FACTOR.
China buys most of Sudan's oil (and also supplies arms to Sudan, along with Russia), which comes from S. Sudan. It accounts for about 5 percent of China's oil imports. As a UN Security Council member they have blocked numerous resolutions against Sudan. However there were signs of a shift in China's position, as activists moved to link this protectionist stance toward Sudan with China's 2008 Summer Olympics - preparing to label them the 'Genocide Olympics.' if China did not exert pressure on the GoS to stop their atrocities against civilians and negotiate with the rebels. With this event now passed, the chief leverages will be: (a) pragmatically reinforcing that a secure oil supply is best obtained from a country not on the brink of imploding; and (b) in reinforcing a more rather than less noble stance toward world affairs and thus its global self-image.
U.S., CHINA AND THE OIL IN DARFUR QUESTION. [Added: August, 2007]
Is there oil in Darfur? A map of oil concessions shows that Block 6, controlled by China, extends into S. Darfur. An article in the L.A. Times indicated that while the hunt is on, no oil has been found yet, while an article in FinancialSense indicates that Sudan says they have found oil in Darfur. Given that oil was found on the S. Kordofan province border, it seems likely that it extends into Darfur. Oil in N. Darfur seem less certain (although my Darfuri contacts say there is), and Block 12 in N. Darfur has been picked up by Arab interests and reportedly has Chinese expertise ready to explore it. It is too speculative right now to do more than raise the issue and acknowledge that ink is spent on denying oil; on theories, conspiratorial or not, about the collusion of the US, the CIA and oil companies; and on China's race to secure as much oil (and other resources) as possible on the African continent (they are actively trying to lure Chad's oil). To what extent there are hidden hands behind the scenes is beyond the scope of this article, except to say that any US collusion (and thus desire for regime change) would have to be squared with the general US trump card mentioned above - terrorist intelligence. And regardless, it remains an open question whether the search for oil in Darfur intensifies the conflict (that is, Sudan wants to grab it from Darfur; though the DPA indicates oil-sharing would ensue) or whether it might ease the tensions, since any oil company, whether Chinese, US or Canadian, can work in conflict regions, but much prefers secure terrain. See Current Status regarding rebels attacks on oil fields.
B. CURRENT STATUS
(Major revision: January 2010)
It is best to distinguish the realm of international dynamics from the on-ground dynamics within Darfur and Sudan more generally.
Summary-Darfur: Within Darfur little positive can be said. The IDP camps, having existed for 7 years now, are cauldrons of lost hope, despair, roiling emotions, fear, and so on. Some are slightly more secure due to UNAMID patrols. Aid to them has become more problematic due to attacks from various groups. The countryside is chaotic and basically lawless; the GoS and its militia carry out aerial and land attacks at will, at times grotesquely similar to the early days, though not as intense or numerous. Banditry is rampant, resulting in numerous aid hijackings and sometimes kidnapping, the latter now even including foreign personnel (not suggesting that such people are more important, only that the attackers are becoming bolder and shifting their demands).Summary-Sudan: Two levels can be distinguished. At one level the CPA provides the framework through which much of Sudan's dynamics are measured. The delayed timetables, yet eventual (and contentious) census, have all reduced the sense of legitimacy for the April, 2010 national elections. The violence and crackdown in December, 2009 toward political parties and their expressions (HRW: Abuses Undermine Impending Elections), bodes ill for any sense of free campaigning environment, and should have been a trigger-point in Obama's new Sudan policy. More troubling is the 2011 referendum on whether the South will remain in Sudan or secede. Most chatter in the South, and now including a strong hint by the South's V.P. Salva Kiir, point to an independent South as the likely outcome.
On a second level, and one which some view as clear-eyed realisitic while others deem as distorting in its presumption and lack of seeing alternatives in the growing slate of candidates for the Presidential election, one looks primarily at military buildup and the historic legacy of President Bashir to do whatever it takes to remain in power, presumabaly meaning retention of all or at least significant oil revenue. From this perspective, it is clear that both sides have used much of the oil wealth to build up their military capabilities. The chief prize is the oilfields in the middle. The north has an ill-committed army but has almost total air control. The South has a more highly armed and committed army. The oil pipeline only flows through the North, although a Southern pipeline is planned. It is hard not to read the desire of the North for total control of the oil region. A wild-card in here is China. China clearly needs the oil to keep coming; one would think it in China's best interest to maintain a stable region. Yet there has been little overt evidence of this. More later.
Summary-International:
a. The U.S.: In October, 2009, the US finished it new policy review of Sudan. It is to be a cornerstone for future relations, containing both {secret} incentives and disincentives to help move Sudan toward implementation of its peacs agreements and peace in the region. However, several potential trigger points have come and gone without any reaction. In January 2010, a high-level committee did sit down to assess the situation but it apparently lacked some critical information. Thus while one is ready to deem it yet another failed effort, it may - hope against hope - stilll yield results. That said, time is so short now, with the national election in April of 2010. It is largely presumed President Bashir will win (although one can't completely discount some bumps, with a robust slate of candidates from other parties). Nonethelss it seems any other outcome is unlikely, and if so, then it becomes more difficult to leverage someone who has been elected, sham or not. More later.
b.The ICC indictment has seen President Bashir scramble to find sufficient backing to have any possible ICC judgment suspended through the UN. The U.S. has said it will block any such suspension (In late February, 2009 that has been revised and they would now consider deferral if the GoS replaces Bashir or enters into serious reform). The ICC ruling occurred on March 4, 2009 and decided to proceed with the charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes. Procescutor Ocampo is gathering more evidence to resubmit charges of genocide.
President Bashir reacted to the ruling by expelling 13 international humanitarian organization (plus 3 Sudanese ones). These organizations accounted for about 40% of the aid. Bashir announced that Sudan would make up the difference, incredulous as that was to most experts. Bashir has since loosened some of the restrictions, though not to previous levels. The inability to restore such services as assistance to rape and sexual violence victims, in itself should be a trigger point for Obama's new Sudan policy, above.
On March 18, 2009, the Obama administration selected a new Envoy for Sudan, General Scott Gration. His more conciliatory approach ("carrots and no sticks") has gradually made most of the activist community wary of his efforts, though his efforts are still in progress. With the Sudan policy review now completed (Oct/09) Gration seems to remain the main point-person, and creates tension with Ric, who prefers a tougher stance.
Inclusive peace negotiations have thus far failed to restart. Prior to Gration's ongoing efforts, the most promising came from Qatar, who some view as trying to assert itself as a new peace mediator. The GoS and the Darfur rebel movement JEM signed a "confidence-building" agreement in late February, 2009. While one can never discount such ad hoc gestures, the self-serving nature of the agreement from both sides, leaves it suspect, and has remained boycotted by other groups (of the other 4 major rebel groups, some remain suspicious of its Arab background, and SLA/Al-Nur remain firm that no formal negotiations can take place until Sudan's government stops its attacks). The latest set of talke are for mid-February 2010. The GoS has indicated that all such negotiations must be completed by March/10.
Current Status Details:
ICC Prosecutor's Call to Indict President Bashir and Resulting Charges: On July 14, 2008, the chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno-Ocampo, submitted to the judges 10 charges against Sudan's President Bashir, including charges of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. On March 4, 2009 the three ICC judges did charge President Bashir with crimes against humanity and war crimes; they did not feel the evidence submitted thus far for genocide was tight enough to win in court. This is the first time that a sitting head of state has been considered for such charges from the ICC (Milosevic was under another court). On April 27, 2007, the ICC already issued arrest warrants for two Sudanese - Humanitarian Affairs Minister Ahmed Haroun and Janjaweed leader Ali Muhammad Ali Abd al-Rahman (Ali Kushayb), although nothing has happened to them, as Sudan said they are capable of prosecuting any war crimes suspects (they later elevated Haroun to his current post, which oversees aid to the very people on whom he is accused of orchestrating atrocities). In November 2008, Ocampo also submitted charges against three rebel leaders for the killing of UN peacekeepers. Their names have not been revealed.
This is the first international action, apart from some minor pressure exerted by China prior to its Olympics, that President Bashir has taken seriously.. He has threatened (and on March 4, 2009 followed through with) retaliatory action if the charges proceed. See Analysis Section-ICC for the various views of how this action by the ICC can be seen as pitting peace against justice, and what I consider to be the most promising stance.
North-South Sudan Dynamics (ongoing draft)
The 2010 elections and more importnantly the 2011 referendum, will play a major role in Darfur's future.
Note:
ICG report that 2500 deaths, 350,000 displaced in S. Sudan in 2009. Many factors in tribal conflict. Interesting that while plausible that it shows the hand of NCP, they feel primarily the wekness of S. Sudan structures. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6182&l=1
Attempted Coup of May 10, 2008: The Darfur rebel group JEM (Justice and Equality Movement) raced across the desert from Darfur in the night and struck from the North of Sudan's capital, Khartoum, making its way into the twin city of Omdurman. While heavily fortified Khartoum was seemingly taken by surprise, the rebels came within kilometers of the center of Khartoum before being repulsed. JEM's leader Kahlil Ibrahim eventually escaped, indicating that, as they stated earlier, they would take Darfur's war to Khartoum, and that this attack was not the end. The short-term repercussions are that (a) diplomatic ties were mutually cut between Sudan and Chad, after Sudan accused Chad of backing JEM (and in February 2008, Chad accused Sudan of backing the rebels that almost reached the palace in Chad's capital N'Djamena); (b) there was a reported purge among the military of suspected conspirators and sympathizers (many in the military are Darfurian, although generally mainly foot-soldiers); (c) Human Rights groups reported civilians being arrested or beaten on the basis of ethnicity (see Sudan Tribune article). It should be noted that JEM had already taken the conflict outside Darfur into the neighbouring province of Kordofan, where in 2007 they had attacked an oilfield, briefly holding some hostages.
Overall Deaths: Up until the end of 2007, there has been much less fighting compared to its height in 2004 & 2005, in no small part because up to 90% of the villages have been destroyed – there simply are not as many easy targets. The number of overall deaths is conservatively estimated to be at least 200,000 with many suggesting it is closer to 400,000 or above [In August, 2007 there was criticism of the 400,000 figure - see NYT article. Eric Reeves, who has provided the most extensive analysis, counters with a scathing critique of the methods used. In April 2007, the UN suggested a figure of perhaps 300,000. I agree with a ForeignPolicy critique, that 200,000 is likely far too low, Sudan clearly obstructs any true attempt at accurate figures, and, regardless, either number is appalling].
By 2005 the proportion of deaths reversed, with more people dying indirectly due to disease, etc in the refugee and IDP camps. Later, due to the humanitarian agencies, the camp death and disease rate lessened somewhat (though were still mottled with infiltration, rapes etc), but the agencies became increasingly at risk (hijackings and even deaths of workers), and were sometimes forced to pull-out.
By the end of 2007, reports indicated a major deterioration, as the camps were full, the GoS has tried to forcibly remove some people back to the land, and arms have flooded the camps. More ominously, as 2008 began, some of the old dynamics had returned - heightened attacks by the GoS militia, with the resulting deaths, rapes and burning of villages. See IDP camp status for likely deterioration due to the expulsion of international aid agencies on March 4, 2009.
As well, throughout this period the conflict spilled
over the border into
Peace Agreements:
The {non-Darfur} Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed January 9, 2005 to end the North-South war, needs to be seen as one of the anchors of the overall hope for peace in Darfur (See Strategies, below, for a complete list of the broad dynamics that must be considered). Most of its contentious issues were postponed and have raised their heads now. I will mention the two most troubling, since the failure of the CPA could plunge the country into civil war. (1) The Abyei region: It is the oil-rich land between the North and South. The CPA mandated an independent committee to decide its boundaries. They did, and while considered by many to be generous to the North, Bashir ignored broke his promise to abide by it. Since then growing tensions, including troop build-ups and actual clashes and some death have resulted. It remains a power keg; (2) The national census, necessary prior to the 2009 elections: In Darfur, the census has proceeded, even though widely protested on the basis that with over 2 million of the 6 million Darfuris in camps, and some of the land resettled by Arabs, it would be a farce, grossly distorting the real picture in favour of Bashir. In protest SLA/Unity has reportedly captured 13 census takers as spies.
The actual basic Darfur peace agreement dynamics have been as follows:
A. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA, May, 2006): It was breached soon after it went into effect. The one rebel party who signed it, has been accused of aiding the counter-insurgency, and has reportedly had many of its fighters leave. Its head, Mini Minawi, was appointed Special Assistant to Sudan's president.
B. The UN Security Council Resolution 1706, passed on August 31, 2006, authorized a UN peacekeeping force of 20,000 under the robust engagement of a Chapter VII mandate, to replace the inadequate African Union force of 7,000 operating under a "observer-only" mandate. While this was a remarkable vote in that China and Russia abstained rather than their customary vetoing any substantive act against Sudan, it still became quagmired due to Sudan's refusal to accept it (the resolution did not need Sudan's consent; it only "invited" it) which divided the international whether to proceed regardless.
It should be noted that while the initial GoS reaction was to cite fears of neocolonialism, which has played well for it own audience, it is an absurd claim, given that they have allowed over 10,000 UN peacekeeping troops in S. Sudan to help with the CPA (the North-South agreement).
C. The Three-Phase Plan: Subsequently there was much diplomatic pressure on the GoS to agree to a three-phase plan to allow more peacekeeping troops in under the guise of an AU-UN hybrid, 3-stage transition force. Sudan initially balked, but later agreed to all three phases, and even allowed implementation of the first two {easier} phases.
D. Efforts to Unite Rebels: Starting in July, 2007, in a meeting in Libya, five of the {minor} rebel groups agreed to unite, in anticipation of renewed {start of the start of} peace negotiations, which took place in Tanzania in August and included most of the rebel factions. There are continuing efforts to bring Abdel Wahed Mohamed el-Nur (an originator of the SLA) to the negotiations, since while he has little troop presence, he is hugely popular, in what some see as a more realistic stance towards the GoS' often deferring and deflecting dynamics. See below for recent timeline. In December France allowed El-Nur to stay on condition that he attend upcoming peace negotiations. The JEM movement under Dr. Ibrahim, also boycotted most such efforts, although most seasoned analysts feel that artificial deadlines are harmful and the best prospect is exactly what is occurring - ongoing informal talks, such as have occurred in Juba.
On the ground, the rebels remain splintered - JEM has split into two; there are over a dozen groups, though one must recognize that some are created with few resources merely for personal stature and gain (the enough Project provided an extensive report, reinforcing my statements that there are only about 4 major rebel groups; see: {cite report}). The SLA and JEM factions remain active militarily. JEM has been seemingly substantially re-armed, becoming active beyond Darfur's borders. They recently attacked an oil field in Kordofan province, shot down a GoS Antonov plane, and have attacked government positions, although it has been suggested that some of these efforts are in conjunction with one of the militarily strong SLA factions. Of more interest is that some of the Arab groups are joining the rebels, feeling they have largely been betrayed or manipulated by the GoS. As well, one of the strongest groups, the SLA/Unity, are actively trying to unite various groups.
Post-JEM attack: Finally, after the failed May 10, 2008 attack on Khartoum by JEM, it is clear that JEM is following its own agenda, and is one that will likely bring more hardship to the Darfuri people, barring some grand overwhelming strategy that might end the conflict. Some analysts see more of an agenda to jockey JEM into a position at the expense of the Darfurians (NYT article May 12, 2008). Its "confidence-building" agreement with the government, signed in Feb. 2009 in Doha, is clearly self-serving for both sides - Bashir desperately needs to look like he has turned the page and is now serious about Darfur's peace; JEM use the negotiations to elevate its political stature as the primary rebel force with enough power to be of concern to Bashir; Its initial statements about being the only group that should represent Darfur, and once signed, the rest of Darfur would go along, can be seen as indications of its desire for political power, extending nationally.
SLA/el-Nur expressed sympathy with the JEM attack; the South's Vice-President Kiir of SPLM has spoken against the attack, advocating a united Sudan under the CPA; SLA/Unity has not currently given its position.E. The UN Security Council Resolution 1769 (acronym UNAMID) was unanimously passed on July 31, 2007. It consolidated the efforts of 1706 and the UN-AU hybrid concept into a peacekeeping force of 26,000 (to be deployed likely by the spring of 2008). On the positive side, China and Russia agreed to the motion, Sudan has accepted it thus far, it contains the necessary robust Chapter VII mandate, and has clear milestones, noted below. On the negative side, its watered down nature glaringly excludes disarming the Janjaweed (present in previous motions), omitted a no-fly-zone protection (though this is a contentious issue with aid agencies who feel such restrictions would severely hamper their efforts), does not address border issues with Chad, and of most potential significance, has a timeline that invites classic GoS subverting and delaying tactics. Already there has been contention around its make-up (all-African or not) and perplexity about how the troop commitments will be filled. It should also be noted that during this period, Sudan again began some aerial bombing in Darfur and more OMINOUSLY, has allowed thousands of Janjaweed to occupy land left by the Darfurians who fled their homes.
You can now observe the timeline and its status/slippage:
October 2007: possible start of Sudan-Darfur rebels peace talks;
The talks took place in Libya but were unsuccessful, or more accurately premature, since the rebel factions have not agreed to a unified position. The rebels had earlier met but all the major groups boycotted the Libya talks. I think the best view of this is that it needs to be seen as one of many steps needed. It appears that the parties have learned from the failure of the DPA, where artificial deadlines were set and thus failure ensued. As long as genuine progress is being made - and there is much room and desire (as well as opportunity to delay and subvert things) - the dynamics should be allowed to reach their natural conclusion. The biggest current step is for the major rebels groups, combined with Darfur civil society more generally, to agree on their demands.
Oct 31: UNAMID command centre to be operational in Darfur;
Despite Sudan's foot-dragging, on Oct 31, the UN's first centre was reportedly operational in one provincial capital, El Fasher. This is very encouraging, though it is premature to say how significant it will be.
Dec 31: Transfer of authority from AU to UNAMID; Start of troop deployment.
On January 1, 2008, the existing AU troops replaced their green berets for the UN blue berets. Not much else has changed yet. Here is a sample of Bashir's obstructionist tactics that has slowed the efforts, to the point where questions are being raised about its viability: he has prohibited almost all non-African troops, often using absurd claims; he has dragged out the whole process through making visas and Port access difficult; and through pathetic negotiations on land and water usage for troops (yes, as with any good manipulator, there will be a grain of legitimacy somewhere in the issue), restrictions on airstrip usage, prohibiting night flights, requiring advance notice of troop movement and even requiring communications be shut down when Sudan conducts its own military operations.
January, 2010: UNAMID is at about 75-80% capacity.
Much more stunning has been the reticence of the Western world (and Arab world as well) to provide the heavy lift capabilities needed and requested months ago. The most striking example has been the UN request for 24 helicopters - the Secretary General specifically asked every UN member . . and has yet to get even a single helicopter committed!! (Revised: - Ethiopia is to deliver 5 helicopters in Feb/10, still a pitiful response). It reinforces last year's synopsis that, apart from the world really not caring much or not having the institutional structures that can leverage the concern that exists, that Iraq has siphoned both resources and political will for Darfur. When that is layered atop some legitimate concerns about the logistics and ability to succeed, we end up with the tepid response that President Bashir relishes.
Refugee and IDP Camps: In the fall of 2006, many of the humanitarian NGOs issued a warning that they could not hold out much longer under current conditions that included restricted access and threats to its workers. Many areas outside the camps are inaccessible and thus there is no accurate way of knowing how many people are affected, though between 2.5 and 4 million people (out of 6 million in Darfur) forms the usual bounds for numbers.
In June, 2007, Oxfam permanently withdrew from Darfur's largest refugee camp of 130,00 people, Gereida, citing inaction over requests for better security, following the death of an aid worker, violence against others, and continual hijacking of vehicles of various agencies.
With the March 4, 2009 expulsion of 13 international aid agencies (plus 3 local NGOs), about 40% of the aid capacity has been cut in Darfur (and also affects such conflict areas as Eastern Sudan). Sudan's claim to be able to fill that gap is not seen as credible. Much medical aid ceased and such problems as a meningitis outbreak that was under control via MSF, will now start to take its toll. By the beginning of April the camps will be running out of clean water, diarrhea will spread and children will die. And all that is before the food runs out. People will likely flee and overwhelm the camps in Chad or other areas, if they survive the trek.
It must be noted that rape as a
weapon is still being used – women who venture outside the camps to get
firewood are often attacked and raped by the Janjaweed. Rape within some of the camps also occurs. In addition, by the end of 2007, it was reported that arms had been flooding into many camps, making them dangerous at any time.
International Criminal Court (ICC): On Feb. 27, 2007, the ICC
named its first two suspects for allegedly committing war crimes in
C. ANALYSIS [Updated: December, 2009]
The basic anchoring point is that one of the prime duties of a
government is to protect its people. Not
only has
The above brief survey should be sufficient to demonstrate that while there are many layers at play in this conflict, claims by the government tend to use selective and minor aspects of the overall picture (such as it being a conflict of farmers versus nomads, or that they can’t control the Janjaweed – yes there likely are both rogue and fickle elements as indicated above, but the overall picture leans heavily on the side of the GoS control). The GoS is a master of manipulation, deception and divide-and-conquer techniques.
Finally, while many reports tend to view the GoS as a unified entity, I find Alex de Waal's framing a balancing perspective, viewing it as a continuously in-flux and virtually dysfunctional struggle internally by various power groups and sub-groups, combining with pragmatic alliances with equally self-serving neighbouring players. The stronger one feels that this analysis is correct, the stronger one will advocate all other means of changing the calculus of the GoS, primarily via negotiation (largely based on or patterned after the CPA, improbable as he finds that), over any form of military intervention. And if military proposals are to be part of any package, they must not imply regime change (except through democratic elections, such as those scheduled by July 2009 as mandated by the CPA), since this regime, like almost any, would fight it and it has ably demonstrated its monstrous capabilities. His 26-page analysis (the 2nd of two PDF parts) can be Downloaded Here.
Thus, while I find de Waal's highly detailed and nuanced work of value, and have expanded the Strategy section below based on some of his observations, I also believe there is sufficient wriggle room to advocate a ramp-up on the various fronts. As he and others have noted, Sudan thrives on empty gestures; thus on all fronts (negotiations and other diplomatic channels; sanction threats and other forms of pressure; and peace-keeping operations) the ramp-up must be credible. And even with that, the key will be in the proper emphasis and timing within the complete package.
Summary of Major Stances: Before delving into the actual strategies, it should be noted that in many ways the Darfur crisis is a microcosm of international politics - no one can read the mind of another (in this case the GoS decision makers) nor predict with certainty the future; thus one is left making various risk-benefit assessments. In this case the broadest distinction is between those, such as Alex de Waal, who conceptually do not find genocidal intent rampant, but rather the above chaotic, shifting mix of agendas, and end up concluding that any military (or most other coercive) action will almost inevitably make things worse and that the focus must be on whatever instruments will strengthen democratic dynamics (thus ensure the CPA is supported and whatever else that will lead to the 2009 elections; as well as any negotiations that might mitigate Darfuri suffering now); and on the other hand, people like John Prendergast, who believe genocidal-or-ethnic-cleansing dynamics are deliberate and that coercive pressure (UN military, sanctions, divestments, etc) has a good chance of lessening those dynamics (as part of his 3Ps: peace negotiations, protection of civilians and punishment of those responsible). These distinct views require more dialogue to clarify best strategies (and I hope will occur). In general the strategies below are a mixture that leans more heavily on the latter stance, for reasons that currently remain beyond the scope of this article.
Most Likely Default Outcome (Dec./09)
ICG and Sudan's Next Step>
Implications of ICC Proceedings Against President Bashir:
As backdrop, the ICC's prosecutor has brought 3 sets of people before the court. In 2007 Ahmed Haroun and Ali Kushayb were named for their roles in Janjaweed atrocities; in July 2008, President Bashir was named on 10 counts; and later the leaders from a rebel movement were included though not named, for the killing of UN peacekeepers. Regarding the first set, Sudan elevated Haroun to a prominent position in Darfur; they also refused to hand over Ali Kushayb, although after President Bashir's indictment, they did arrest him, saying they could look after him, although nothing more has come of it.
I wish to briefly focus on the effect of naming President Bashir. There were immediate cheers from the IDP camps and other Darfuris (as well as some S. Sudanese). For many in Darfur, who have faced gang rape, watched family tortured or killed and their entire communities destroyed, who have been packed into IDP or refugee camps, which are not safe and often deteriorating - they have nothing left to lose - there is no peace anyway, their only hope is for the justice of seeing Bashir clearly named for what they know him as - a repulsive tyrant who masterminded the atrocities. In my opinion this group sub-divides into those who naively think that the ICC can arrest Bashir (they can't; they have no power to do so and must rely on him being handed over); those who believe this will eventually be a tipping point for the internal struggle within the government, and the GoS will see Bashir as a liability, not likely handing him over but more likely shuffling him off to a safe country (and of course, depending on who one thinks will emerge as the next leader, the outcome will vary); and finally those who still don't see much hope for Darfur, but simply take satisfaction in all they have left - that Bashir has been clearly named for the whole world to see the contemptuous criminal that he is. (See links below for more in-depth debate).
President Bashir, clearly worried, denounced the charges, labeled them Western interference, smacking of neo-colonialism. He threatened to pull aid workers (and on March 4, 2009 when the ICC issued a warrant for him, he expelled 13 aid agencies accounting for about 40% of Darfur's aid; more on this, below) and threatened peacekeepers and Westerners in general in Sudan. He set about rallying the support of the Arab League, the African Union and others, to have the case deferred; some of that initial support has waned recently. Because of his control of the media in Sudan, he has indicated he will rally support within Sudan. In essence he has tried to signal that if the "West" thinks the ICC will bring justice by calling for his arrest, then it may come at the expense of any hopes for peace.
It has created a vigorous debate in the international community about the implications, should the ICC proceed to charge him, as is expected on Mar 4, 2009. For many it is a choice of justice - support the ICC despite consequences; the reasons for doing so may stem from their support of the innocent victims' stated desires, or may come from the desire to eventually have a more just world and that takes a forum like the ICC that can be seen as credible and successful, etc. That only comes about with hard choices; the alternative is to perpetuate around the world, the tyrannical thuggery that we allow under the guise of national sovereignty (much ink has also be used looking at previous indictments to suggest, anecdotally, that in general such charges tend to diminsh the person's stature and do not result in greater long term chaos - for example, former Yugoslavia's Milosevic, Liberia's Charles Taylor, and the current Ugandan LRA leaders). It may also stem from believing that Bashir has manipulated any agreement for his purposes and will continue to do so, and thus those who feel such a process may lead to peace are deluded, including those who feel the CPA is a counter-example (no, even there Bashir has simply drawn out the process to avoid giving away substantive power, and has been manipulating the census, etc., to ensure he will win any eventual elections, etc).
For others it is a choice of peace - negotiations are the only way to produce lasting peace and the ICC move either shreds such a path or at least makes it problematic; they see in the broader picture that Sudan's North-South agreement, which ended 20 years of war, with 2 million dead, and which is in a very fragile state, could unravel due to the implications of charging Sudan's head of state, which could plunge the whole nation into civil war. The best path is to minimally defer the charges (done within the UN Security Council, annually) which might maintain enough peace/stability to perhaps resolve the obstacles to peace agreements. For some, Bashir needs to stay in order to implement the remaining critical elements of the CPA; for others, having the government remove Bashir and provide him safe haven in another country, would be much preferable. Either way, justice won't technically be served, but over time if all works out, the people's lives can resume some form of normalcy, which really is the desired goal. It may even be possible to obtain justice later, according to historical precedent (whereby many leaders charged only on paper, eventually did end up being caught).
Of course everyone would prefer peace with justice and the above can only sketch the most basic of positions, Darfur showing how complex that can be in reality. Relevant here, is this website's notion of Well-Being, which holds in tension the complexity of factors involved here. For me, I side with the ICC, partly because enough seemingly informed Darfuris do, and partly because I think there are enough openings to move forward without a significant loss as viewed through Darfuri eyes (and many S. Sudanese eyes as well). I doubt true justice will be served, at least in the short term, and I think some greater violence is most likely to occur in the short term. But if the Darfuris are willing to take that risk, then I support them, and call on the international community to exert the type of overwhelming impetus for peace with justice, narrow as that path is (diplomatic primarily, but also protecting the civilians via a fully supported UNAMID) that Bashir, and the government in general might actually heed.
Links of fuller debate:
Enough Project Support of ICC
Alex de Waal, et al, on Problems of ICC (especially Feb 11-9 entries)
Short articles:
NYT: Desmond Tutu: African leaders should support justice and ICC
NYT: Graham: Defer Charges; N-S Agreement needs Bashir; He can adapt
Implications of JEM attacks on Khartoum, May, 2008: JEM's stated aim in attacking Khartoum, was to bring the Darfur conflict to the capital, to burst the "Khartoum bubble" - where those living in the capital had previously been insulated from the conflict via distance and media manipulation. JEM has stated that by bringing the conflict to the capital, it will exert pressure on President Bashir to resolve the conflict. Even if this is taken at face-value, it is a gamble involving both the Darfuris living in Khartoum, who have and could continue to be targeted by the government; and Darfur at large, as it easily plays into the hands of GoS hardliners. However as noted above in the NYT article, it could also be a move having more to do with the status of JEM than direct concern for Darfur. These can only remain conjectures at this early stage in these changed dynamics.
D. STRATEGIES TO END
THE CONFLICT [Revisions: Major: August, 2007; Minor: December, 2009]
There are three levels that require attention in order to bring lasting peace to Darfur: (1) Darfur and its relationship with the Sudanese government; (2) Sudan itself, which, due to its history of a strong center neglecting or playing off its peripheries, remains vulnerable to having any internal agreement unravel due to this unstable arrangement (for example, there is real concern about the possible unraveling of the CPA [North-South agreement], which would most likely drag down with it any Darfur agreement; brewing issues have also existed in the East and in the North); (3) Sudan's neighbouring countries, which continually present instability factors.
Dec./09: The following points remain the key and multi-layered pieces of the puzzle. But is is worthy to add that since the U.S. revised Sudan Policy, combined with the AU report, there is the possibility of anchoring a coherent international stance that, with sufficient backing and continued monitoring, would maximize the chances that the pieces of the puzzle may be actually put into proper place.
1.
DARFUR: Just Peace Agreement:
Ultimately negotiation is the only step to a lasting peace. There are three essential common goals that must be addressed, as clarified by the Enough Project [Common Requirements]: (1) Political empowerment (the lack of this is what ignited the 2003 attacks); it must be based on the 1993 census not the 2008 one which left out all displaced people; (2) Security: This starts with the full UNAMID deployment, includes a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program (DDR), ending with a displaced people feeling secure enough to return home and finding a new civilian police and dispute mechanism program, partly relying on traditional dynamics as suitable; (3) Welfare: All dispossessed people will receive adequate restitution of stolen livestock, etc; The issue of land tenure must also be satisfactorily resolved.
Steps to assist this include (not in any order; they are all needed):
a.
Unifying the Rebel
Voice:
The rebel movement has fractured into many factions (although again I suggest the number is overplayed - there are 4 or 5 groups that should be part of the political process; the remainder are largely minor groups motivated by opportunism or plain banditry; this view has been reinforced by Enough Report on Rebels). Until the rebels can agree on a common set of
demands, noted above, negotiations will remain uncertain.
Efforts have occurred, although prior to the first two meetings their
locations were bombed by the GoS. More concerted international effort is needed
to expedite this process, and the August 2007 meetings were wobbly steps in this effort. The May 10, 2008 attacks by JEM on Khartoum, call into question the whole enterprise of rebel unification. In the aftermath, the SLA/Unity position must be clarified before anything meaningful can be stated (SLA/Unity controls North Darfur and is active in West and South Darfur. With up to 20,000 troops, they remain a somewhat little understood factor).
b.
Giving Darfur Its
Own Voice:
The original DPA was flawed in that it didn’t include
the voices of all the stakeholders in
c.
Resolving the Issue of Land Tenure:
Traaditionally, the farmers have had a form of title to land while the camel-herding nomadic Arab Darfur tribes have not. Years ago there was a missed opportunity to resolve this. With desertification squeezing the available land, it increases tension. In some ways this is a sub-heading under the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue - all parties must come to some concensus on how to fairly resolve this issue. It is hard to imagine sustainable peace otherwise.
d.
Changing the
Calculus of the GoS: so that it finds it in its own self-interest to enter into
true negotiations, as opposed to using negotiations as stalling tactics. (see
some of the interim actions).
2.
DARFUR: Interim Actions:
a.
The Janjaweed and all
other hostilities must be stopped. This
has been agreed to, and then ignored on several occasions.
b.
Ensure access for
humanitarian aid – it has often been restricted and aid workers threatened; the expelled aid capacity must be reinstated.
c.
Strengthen the
moderate voices within
d.
Freeze assets on key figures who planned or orchestrated
the atrocities;
e.
Authorize a forensic
accounting firm to aid those seeking to uncover the corruption of the GoS leaders and to try to trace companies providing
financial support to the illegal militias ( see ICG
Briefing #43, Oct 12, 2006);
f.
Impose travel bans on
key figures;
g.
Impose sanctions that
harm the perpetrators but not the population at large;
h.
Enforce a no-fly zone
for Darfur, though only in conjunction with full package;
i.
Act to reduce the
growing effect in neighbouring countries;
3.
DARFUR: Last Resort:
a.
Implement the full
force of UN Security Council Resolution 1769, which transitions the woefully
understaffed 7000 AU peacekeepers into a more fully robust AU-UN hybrid mission
of an additional 26,000 personnel. UNSC 1769 took effect on Jan. 1, 2008, but has been hobbled both by GoS roadblocks and the international community's reluctance to fully embrace it (incredulously being unable thus far to find 24 - yes 24 - helicopters among the thousands that are collectively owned or could be leased . . . and yes it does require extra helicopters, acceptable pilots, maintenance personnel, etc - but still!!)
b.
It should be noted that according to some
analysts, such as former General Romeo Dallaire (who
headed the UN mission during the Rwandan genocide) that he estimates needing at
least 40,000 troops.
4.
SUDAN: Strengthen and Broaden the CPA:
The GoS has other smoldering peripheries than Darfur. The South's agreement, the CPA, which it signed in 2005, is fraying. Its deadlines are behind schedule, its division of oil revenues does not yet match its targets, etc. In many ways, the fate of Darfur and the South are intertwined. The GoS also has conflictual situations in the East and North. Unless it wants a perpetual state of crisis (which has served it well in the past, but does make it vulnerable to manipulation from neighbouring countries, as well as vulnerable to any form of uniting of the peripheries), it needs to strengthen the CPA and use it as a basis to address the country-wide concerns. While this seems like quite a conceptual leap, it must be continually raised up by the international community as Sudan's only real hope for stability. For more details, see International Crisis Group Recommendations.
5.
SUDAN'S NEIGHBOURS: Stabilize the Whole Region:
On August 22, 2007, a draft proposal was being circulated to help address the spillage of the Darfur conflict into Chad and the Central African Republic (See Guardian article; Update: The EU will send over 3,500 troops starting in Feb/08 - see Reuters article). While it holds some promise, it is only part of the overall picture that must be held in view. Sudan shares borders with 9 other countries; For example,on its eastern section, Sudan and Ethiopia have interacted for better and generally worse, for decades, and more recently Eritrea (and Dec/07, even Kenya convulsed, previously a relative bastion of stability, and aside, its opposition leader previously had ties to Sudan). Thus, at an even more conceptual leap than the above section, true peace and prosperity will require all neghbouring countries to achieve more stable dynamics, whether it is through the existing umbrella organization, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, or some other AU forum. As unthinkable as that may seem, it was at one point, as unthinkable among Europe's countries.
FINAL WORD
All above efforts should be done
simply for the sake of the Darfurian victims, and more generally victims within the entire region. However I wish to end on a more visionary
note, however improbable. Should the
Darfur crisis be properly resolved, one hundred years from now it just might
been seen as the pivotal tangible action that started the world towards the end
of genocide and other acts whereby international thugs had been allowed free
reign, hiding behind the rule of national sovereignty. The international pieces are in place to take
international structures and dynamics to a new plateau, thanks to the UN
Assembly’s accepting the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, and the UNSC adopting Resolution 1706, based on it (now morphed into Resolution 1769). I doubt I will see the fruition of this
process in my lifetime, but the ending of slavery did occur (with exceptions)
and while this next level is a quantum level more complex to implement, sooner
or later enough of the world will see that a more decent world dynamic is in
everyone’s best long-term interest and such a vision will prevail.
Main Sources:
M. W. Daly: Darfur's Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007): Most detailed and coherent of recent histories.
Alex de Waal, editor: War In Darfur And The Search For Peace (Harvard: Global Equity Initiative, 2007): Interesting set of authors; worth it simply for Alex de Waal's highly detailed post-mortem of the DPA negotiation dynamics.
Julie Flint and Alex de Waal: Darfur: A Short History of a Long War (
Gerard Prunier:
Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide (
Various UN reports and documents; ICG, HRW, and SSRC (de Waal) reports; New York Times, Washington Post, and Sudan Tribune articles.
APPENDIX: SPREAD OF
BBC website: (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6213202.stm)
The BBC News website examines how this instability has spilled
over into neighbouring
JANJAWEED AND
1.
2.
CAR REBELS
3. The
4.